TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/090991/0909100.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 11.6 KB | 222 lines

                                                                                NATION, Page 16

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

After The War


Bush is cautious as the collapse of Moscow's empire offers new
challenges for the U.S.

By STANLEY W. CLOUD -- With reporting by Michael Duffy/
Kennebunkport, Laurence I. Barrett and Bruce van Voorst/
Washington


    The cold war officially ended two weeks ago with the collapse
of the coup in Moscow and the subsequent rout of the Communist
Party by reformers bearing the twin banners of democracy and
Mother Russia. If it had been a hot war, some soldier might have
rushed into an American general's tent, crying, "Sir, Moscow has
fallen!" As it was, there was just the quiet realization that the
world had changed utterly and that where East-West relations are
concerned, the past was no longer prologue.

    For two generations, Americans have largely defined their
country and, to some extent, themselves in terms of the cold war.
From McCarthyism to backyard bomb shelters, from the arms race to
the space race, from Alger Hiss to the Marine spy scandal --
whatever else might have changed, the cold war abided. Moreover,
it all too often metastasized into an honest-to-goodness shooting
war, as in Korea and Vietnam. Now, however, only the most
troglodytic right-wingers refuse to acknowledge that a new era
has dawned. Says former CIA Director Richard Helms: "Years ago,
when I was at the agency, from time to time I'd ask people, `How
would you feel if the Soviet Union just broke up, if there were
chaos and no one was in control?' Well, now we're finding out."

    For Helms and many other Americans, victory in the cold war
has its frightening aspects. The Soviet implosion could leave a
destabilizing void in international affairs. "If there are 15
different republics, who sits at the U.N. Security Council?"
wonders Robert Hormats, a former Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic and Business Affairs. "If there's no Soviet Union,
who's the other [Middle East peace] sponsor? We've never seen the
dissolution of an empire of this magnitude." Indeed, as a senior
White House official put it last week, "it's a case of the U.S.
deciding what it means to be the only superpower. For the past
year, we all thought the new world order meant a partnership
with the Soviet Union. Well, what if there's no partnership? What
if it's a newer world order, one in which we're the only
superpower? What are our responsibilities then?"

    Among other things, there is a growing awareness that too
little thought has been given to the kind of country the West
would like the Soviet Union to be. A non-communist federalist
union, similar to the U.S. but dominated by Russia? A collection
of separate, unallied states? A loose economic community of
independent republics, with separate governments and defense
forces but the Soviet nuclear arsenal controlled by a central
authority?

    The last possibility seems to be the one preferred by many
officials in the Bush Administration, although wait-and-see is
the only currently announced policy. "An ideal Soviet Union,"
says one of the Administration's Soviet experts, "would be a
European version of the Organization of African Unity -- that's
the best they can do." Helms predicts "a very disorderly world"
just ahead, but he would like to see an "arrangement where the
basic elements of the Soviet empire remained in some
confederation." Others think such weighty analysis is premature.
Says an exultant Burton Pines, senior vice president of the
conservative Heritage Foundation: "We won! We won! And I think
we ought to be able to take time out for a victory celebration."

    Understandable as that sentiment may be, President Bush and
his aides last week went out of their way to avoid the appearance
of gloating. Whether they were discussing economic aid for the
Soviet Union or U.S. recognition of the independence-seeking
Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Bush and his
top advisers, vacationing in Kennebunkport, Me., sought to
project what one aide termed "incredible calm and confidence."
For the most part, they succeeded. The closest Bush came to
patting himself on the back was when he said, "It has been
fantastic. I'm wondering what we're going to do for an encore
next August." Otherwise, the President played golf and had
separate meetings on the Soviet crisis with Canadian Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney and British Prime Minister John Major.

    Bush, with support from Britain, Canada and Japan, continues
to insist that large-scale aid for the Soviets be withheld until
he sees significant new economic reforms, including steps aimed
at the creation of a free market. The Administration argues that
without such reforms, substantial new aid would be futile. That
is also the official position of the Group of Seven
industrialized democracies. Senior officials in Germany, France
and Italy, three G-7 countries for which Soviet instability would
carry particularly grave consequences, seized on the dramatic
developments of the past two weeks to push for significantly
higher levels of aid. But the U.S.-backed position prevailed last
week at a meeting of senior G-7 officials in London. Asked about
the aid question at a Kennebunkport press conference, Bush said
he would continue to oppose large increases until "the cards are
all laid down on the table."

    The President was similarly cautious on U.S. recognition for
the three breakaway Baltic states, which were forcibly
incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War II. Although
Canada and several other countries granted formal recognition
last week, Bush, reluctant to rekindle Moscow's old fears of U.S.
meddling, delayed. His hope was that Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev would formally acknowledge Baltic independence. If
Gorbachev fails to do so, senior White House aides say, Bush
will act unilaterally as early as this week.

    For all of Bush's skill in foreign affairs, there was
something pinched in his response to the news from Moscow. It is
one thing to be prudent; it is another to seem almost indifferent
to one of the great, defining events of the century. "There's no
point in arguing," says Joshua Muravchik of the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington. "This is a historic
opportunity that shouldn't be missed." Several experts, including
Graham Allison of Harvard University and Robert Hunter of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, have called or
an updated version of the Marshall Plan to help the Soviets out
of their economic crisis. Hunter calls his proposal "the
Democracy Fund" and fixes the initial installment at $10 billion.
"It could be the greatest bargain in history," he says. Adds
Muravchik: "The time is ripe for dramatic initiatives, even at a
time of domestic U.S. deficits . . . Chances like this don't come
often in a lifetime."

    The soaring federal deficit, which is expected to reach
about $362 billion next year, is a major constraint on outright
U.S. aid. So are the current political instability and the slow
pace of economic reform inside the Soviet Union. Thus some
economists argue that the best approach is to let private
investors provide capital for economic recovery. Meanwhile, the
Bush Administration has agreed to ask Congress to provide most-
favored-nation trading status to Moscow, and there is a growing
feeling inside the G-7 that the Soviets are now entitled to
full-fledged membership in the International Monetary Fund.

    Even many of those who back the President's go-slow policy
argue that the U.S. ought to deliver large-scale agricultural
assistance in the event of food shortages this winter. Given the
food surpluses currently being warehoused at federal expense, a
program of that kind would cost the U.S. Treasury little or
nothing. The U.S. and the G-7 have taken modest steps in that
direction and last week decided to accelerate their planning.
But through it all Bush has been decidedly sotto voce.

    The Democrats in Congress may try to force his hand on the
aid question when they return from vacation this month. Les
Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has
proposed diverting $1 billion from the defense budget in order to
provide humanitarian assistance to Moscow. Other Democrats have
begun to revive the idea of a "peace dividend" -- major defense
savings that could, if last year's budget agreement were amended,
be diverted to other purposes at home and abroad. But the growing
deficit, including the cost of the savings and loan bailout,
makes such a dividend as elusive as ever.

    For that matter, the Soviet collapse does not mean the end
to all foreign security threats. "Psychologically, we don't have
to worry about the red terror, nor do we huddle beneath our desks
in schools during bomb drills," says Larry Sabato, a political
science professor at the University of Virginia. "But that
doesn't mean we can live in splendid isolation. Tensions abroad
may justify further defense spending. The nuclear menace won't
disappear. I don't see dictators going away."

    Still, the possibilities inherent in the cold war's end are
tantalizing. Abroad, there could be breakthroughs in areas where
U.S.-Soviet competition has traditionally driven events notably
in the Middle East and Indochina. Another possibility is that the
world's few remaining communist governments might eventually
follow the Soviet Union down the path to democratic reform. At
home, a long list of neglected problems -- education, poverty,
crime, crumbling highways and bridges, the spiraling costs of
health care -- await action and funding. But President Bush, as
usual, prefers to play the custodian rather than the innovator.

    Before his recent summit meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow,
Bush had decided to stand pat on domestic policy as he gears up
for his 1992 re-election campaign. Subsequent events have not
changed that plan -- at least not yet. For now, says an aide,
"Bush's political standing starts with getting the economy right
and getting foreign affairs right." That formula seems to be
working: a TIME/CNN poll taken last week gave the President a
formidable 68% approval rating.

    Bush's continuing popularity is clearly bad news for the
Democrats, whose 1992 election chances have been further dimmed
by the dramatic events in the Soviet Union. Says Democratic
political consultant Greg Schneiders: "It seems that no matter
what happens these days, it helps Bush." None of the likely
Democratic candidates have much to say on foreign affairs, even
though the gulf war and Soviet upheaval have captivated the
public throughout most of this year. The party can only hope
that the voters' attention turns back to domestic affairs next
year -- and that its candidate has a sensible program to offer.
Otherwise the Democrats face a chilling worst-case scenario: that
the party of F.D.R. and J.F.K. may one day join the party of
Lenin and Stalin on the ash heap of history.


____________________________________________________________


    Would it be more in the U.S. interst to    Gorbachev  Yeltsin
have Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsin in         53%       22%
charge of the Soviet Union?

    Should the Western allies provide quick,         Yes     No
large-scale financial aid to the Soviet Union?       23%     68%

    Should the U.S. recognize the Baltic states      Yes     No
of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as independent      67%     18%
nations?


[From a telephone poll of 1,000 adult Americans taken for
TIME/CNN on AUG. 27-28 by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman. Sampling
error is plus or minus 3%. "Not sures" omitted.]